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Abstract 
The labor market effects of pension reform stem from retirement behavior and from job 
search and hours worked of prime age workers. This paper investigates the impact of four 
often proposed policy measures for sustainable pensions: strengthening the tax benefit link, 
moving from wage to price indexation of benefits, lengthening calculation periods, and 
introducing more actuarial fairness in pension assessment. We provide some analytical 
results and use a computational model to demonstrate the economic and welfare impact of 
recent pension reform in Austria. 
Keywords 
Pension Reform, Retirement, Job Search, Life-cycle Unemployment 
JEL Classification 
D58, D91, H55, J26, J64 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
With only few exceptions, industrial countries rely on pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems where the
contributions of active workers must pay for the beneﬁts of old generations in retirement. The
trends in population aging and labor market participation have put pressure on pension systems.
Preserving living standards of retired citizens and at the same time to keep the system ﬁnancially
sustainable requires formidable adjustments. In the absence of reform, pension spending will
grow to unprecedented levels. Sustainability can be restored with three basic measures, or a
combination of them: (i) reduce beneﬁt levels, (ii) raise contribution rates or other taxes, (iii)
raise the statutory and eﬀective retirement age. The common denominator of these reforms is
that, from an individual perspective, the ratio of contributions paid and beneﬁts received over
one’s life-time will deteriorate substantially. Depending on the speciﬁc design and rules of the
system, it will thus be considered as a much less attractive and reliable means to assure one’s
own living standard during retirement.1 Contributions will be increasingly perceived as taxes,
even in a system with a clear tax beneﬁt link, and must be expected to discourage work eﬀort
and job search. Instead of dampening and partly oﬀsetting the demographic reduction of the
workforce, the induced behavioral response may instead exacerbate demographic trends if the
system is not carefully (re-)designed to preserve labor market incentives.
What are exactly the adverse labor market incentives that we think to be particularly harm-
ful? Weil (2006) recently argued that tax distortions from ﬁnancing PAYG pensions are probably
the most important channel through which aging will aﬀect aggregate output. Arguably, the
most important distortion concerns the tendency towards early retirement. Although a general
shift in preferences may have led people to retire earlier for other reasons, early retirement is
importantly induced by the large participation tax rates on continued work as is extensively doc-
umented in the Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004, 2005) worldwide project and subsequent updates.
Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (2000) and Börsch-Supan (2000) provide evidence for Germany and
Samwick (1998), among others, for the U.S. The retirement decision is an example of a discrete
labor supply response on the extensive margin that can be characterized by participation tax
1For a highly selective list of recent reviews of social insurance and pension reform see Pestieau (2006), Diamond
and Orszag (2005), Feldstein (2005), Fenge and Pestieau (2005), Diamond (2004), Bovenberg (2003), Lindbeck
and Persson (2003) and Feldstein and Liebman (2002).
3rates in the sense of Saez (2002), Immervoll et al. (2007), Kleven and Kreiner (2006), as well
as Fisher and Keuschnigg (2007) in the context of pension reform. Hofer and Koman (2006)
calculated these tax rates for the Austrian pension system. Many economists consider the retire-
ment margin the most important behavioral response to pension reform. It would be misleading,
though, to ignore other important repercussions.
The second distortion concerns the intensive labor supply response, i.e. hours worked and
eﬀo r to nt h ej o bo fp r i m ea g ew o r k e r s . I nt h ea b s e n c eo fat a xb e n e ﬁt link, contributions
are fully counted as a labor tax without any individually perceived beneﬁt associated to those
contributions. In this case, social security contributions discourage intensive labor supply just
like a wage income tax. However, if there is an operative tax beneﬁt link, earning more today
raises pension beneﬁts during retirement which encourages labor earnings. Since more earnings
are associated with higher pension beneﬁts, the implicit tax on current earnings is lower than the
statutory contribution rate, as was ﬁrst pointed out by Feldstein and Samwick (1992). Fenge and
Werding (2004) computed those tax rates for Germany. The econometric estimates of Disney
(2004) imply that men are not very responsive to a variation in the eﬀective contribution tax
while women’s activity rates are highly adversely aﬀe c t e dw h i c hi sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hm u c ho ft h e
empirical labor supply literature.
A third distortion from PAYG pension ﬁnancing arises from job search and unemployment,
see Krueger and Meyer (2002) for a review of the empirical evidence. The incentives to search
for and accept an employment opportunity are reduced by all the taxes paid on the salary and
by unemployment beneﬁts and assistance payments lost upon giving up non-employment. One
can deﬁne a participation tax which can be large since it consists of the sum of wage taxes and
foregone transfers during unemployment. The pension contribution rate further adds to this
large participation distortion. However, an extra beneﬁt from accepting an employed income is
that it raises the contribution base for future pensions. Hence, the tax beneﬁt link reduces the
tax component of the contribution rate and thereby strengthens incentives for job search. The
net eﬀect of PAYG contributions thus depends on the size of the implicit tax rate on job search
which is similar to the one on current earnings as mentioned before.
Although the impact of pension reform on labor market incentives seems straightforward
in principle, there are sometimes non-trivial interactions that may generate quite negative con-
4sequences as well. As an example, raising the retirement age and at the same time keeping
statutory contribution rates constant will in fact increase the implicit tax on active workers.
They must pay contributions over a longer period and accordingly receive beneﬁts over a shorter
period of life which makes the system more unfavorable from an individual perspective. Obvi-
ously then, they will perceive a larger share of their contributions as a tax on work eﬀort and
job search. Sometimes, by its very design, pension reform can have uneven eﬀects on life-cycle
employment and earnings. A number of countries have recently prolonged the calculation period
for the pension assessment base, e.g. by including not only the best ﬁve but rather the best ten
years of past earnings, or even the entire life-time employment history. This initiative means
that the implicit tax rate will be cut for younger cohorts of workers, with beneﬁcial consequences
for their labor market incentives, but not for older workers who were already covered by the tax
beneﬁt link. By explicitly considering the typical life-cycle unemployment incidence, we can also
address another question often ignored in pension reform: what are the gains from postponed
retirement when older people are subject to an above average unemployment risk? How does
such reform aﬀect the employment prospects of younger workers?
The central contribution of this paper is to shed light on the labor market incentives from
parametric pension reform and on the possible interaction among them. Based on a small ana-
lytical model, we ﬁrst clarify the key concepts of implicit tax rates on three behavioral margins,
i.e. hours worked, job search and choice of retirement date. The analytical part also serves
to make the most basic reactions of our computational model more transparent. Then we em-
ploy the much more detailed, calibrated model to obtain quantitative magnitudes of behavioral
responses in general equilibrium.2 One of the most novel and policy relevant features of the
computational model is that it captures the life-cycle incidence of unemployment. We can thus
contrast the diﬀerential unemployment experience of younger workers early in their career with
the labor market status of older workers near retirement. This feature is particularly relevant
since policies to raise the average retirement age may have much less potential if unemployment
among older workers is excessive and many of them might not ﬁnd appropriate jobs (see the
discussion in OECD, 2005). Based on key behavioral elasticities reﬂecting the consensus of re-
2We employ a generalized OLG model in the tradition of Blanchard (1985) but extended with demographic
and life-cycle structure, see the Appendix. Recently, Heijdra and Romp (2007, 2008) have developed a stylized,
but analytically solvable model of a similar nature for the analysis of aging and pension reform.
5cent econometric research, we ﬁnd the labor market impact of pension reform in Austria to be
quantitatively substantial but unevenly distributed over the life-cycle.
The Austrian pension system and its recent reform provides a useful showcase because it
includes the main reform strategies that are considered in many other countries as well.3 In
investigating the potential consequences of reform, we consider four often discussed scenarios.
We ﬁrst explore the consequences of lengthening the calculation period for pension assessment.
Several countries, Austria among them, have reformed their pension rules to include the entire
life-time earnings rather than only the best ﬁve or ten years of earnings which will usually
coincide with the last phase of work life. Such a reform essentially means that the last periods
count much less in determining the pension level while earlier years weigh more heavily. Labor
market incentives are shifted from old to young workers. The impact is reinforced if workers in
addition receive a notional interest (equal to the wage growth rate) on their earnings that enter
in the pension assessment base. Second, we investigate a strengthening of the tax beneﬁtl i n k .
The scenario replaces ﬂat pension beneﬁts of the Beveridge type by beneﬁts of the Bismarkian
type that are linked to past earnings or contributions. This can be understood as bringing several
occupational groups such as civil servants who basically received pensions largely unrelated to
past earnings, into a harmonized, earnings linked system. The overall beneﬁt level is thereby
kept constant. Given constant statutory contribution rates, it will be shown that the implicit
tax is reduced on several margins of work.
Third, we study the consequences of moving from wage indexation of pension beneﬁts to price
indexation. The scenario means that pension beneﬁts will grow slower than wage earnings of
active workers so that the replacement rate declines during retirement. Obviously, this strategy
of restraining the growth in pension spending puts the burden on retirees. We will argue,
however, that it has actually quite important consequences for implicit taxes and labor market
incentives of the active workforce as well. Finally, and most importantly, we study the impact of
incentives for postponed retirement by strengthening actuarial fairness of the system, see Gruber
and Wise (1999 and 2005). When a normal beneﬁt level is attained at the statutory retirement
3See Knell, Koehler-Toeglhofer and Prammer (2006), Hofer and Koman (2006), and OECD (2005), for an
insightful description and discussion of pension reform in Austria. Research in the European Commission provides
an international comparison of pension growth and its decomposition into several explanatory factors due to
demographic and economic adjustments, see European Commission (2006).
6age, this scenario raises the pension level permanently whenever people retire later, and cuts it
when they prematurely retire at earlier ages.
The paper proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst present an analytical core model in section 2 that
clariﬁes important concepts and derives already some basic results. Section 3 shortly describes
the structure of the computational model, with more details stated in the appendix. Section 4
shortly reviews recent pension reform in Austria, deﬁnes the policy scenarios in numerical terms,
and discusses the quantitative results. Section 5 concludes.
2L a b o r M a r k e t I n c e n t i v e s
2.1 A Simple Model
To clarify basic concepts and derive key insights, we ﬁrst consider a stylized core model. Workers
live for two periods. Labor is the only input into a linear production technology. The labor
market for young workers is competitive. They are thus paid a gross wage equal to the marginal
product W =1 . Agents are fully employed but work a variable number of hours. In the second
period, they decide about their preferred retirement date which introduces an extensive margin
of aggregate labor supply. People remain active for some time and switch to retirement for the
rest of life. Old workers are subject to unemployment risk. When search eﬀort results in a job
match, workers and ﬁrms bargain over a wage and thereby split the job surplus among them.4
To keep the model as simple as possible, we abstract from unemployment beneﬁts so that the
reservation wage is zero. Bargaining results in a gross wage of w<1.
Life-time utility is assumed linear in consumption and separable in disutility of work related
eﬀort. Present and future consumption, C1 and C2, are perfect substitutes so that people do
not care about the timing but only about the present value of consumption. The interest factor
R =1+r is equal to one plus a constant rate of time preference:
V =[ C1 − ϕ(l)] +
1
R
[C2 − x · ζ (s) − φ(x)],
C1 =( 1 − t)l − S, (1)
C2 = x · (1 − t)we+( 1− x) · P + RS.
4Except for the inﬂuence of the pension system, our static search model follows Boone and Bovenberg (2002).
7Hours worked, l, result in a utility cost ϕ(l). All types of utility costs are assumed convex
increasing. Gross earnings are reduced by pension contributions levied at a proportional rate t.
Private savings S augment future consumption by RS. Agents remain active during a part x of
the second period and supply one unit of labor. A part e of them is employed, the remaining
part u =1− e of the unemployed are left without earnings. Conditional on being active, the
expected wage is (1 − t)we. Workers are retired during a part 1 − x of the second period and
obtain a pension P per capita. We refer to x as the retirement date.
Second period utility increases with consumption C2 but is reduced by the disutility from
two types of labor market activities. Agents incur a utility cost ζ (s) from job search with
intensity s.T h i s e ﬀort cost is incurred only during the active part x, giving total eﬀort cost
xζ (s).S e a r c h e ﬀort determines their individual probability e = sf to locate a suitable job.
With probability 1−e, they remain unemployed. This probability depends on individual search
eﬀort s and a term f that reﬂects labor market tightness and is taken as given by individuals. By
the law of large numbers with independent risks, the individual probability of ﬁnding a job will
be equal to the aggregate employment rate. Since the mass of each generation is also assumed
to be one, aggregate labor supply of the young is l and of the old xe. Finally, life-time utility is
progressively reduced by φ(x) when the retirement date x increases. The increasing aversion to
postpone retirement may be due to deteriorating health and other reasons.5 A st h el a s tl i n ei n
(1) indicates, postponing retirement means earning labor income and paying contributions over
a longer period and consuming pension beneﬁts over a shorter period of time.
Adding production closes the model. The labor market for young workers is assumed com-
petitive. Firms make zero proﬁts and pay a wage equal to exogenous productivity equal to one.
In contrast, market frictions lead to some unemployment in the second period. Old workers can
be hired only in a matching market. Only a fraction x of them participates in the labor market.
Each one searches with intensity s for a job. Hence, the mass of eﬀective job searchers is sx.
Firms place v vacancies. A matching function M (sx,v) represents search frictions, implying
that a fraction q of vacancies is ﬁlled and a fraction f of eﬀective searchers locates a job. These
fractions correspond to individual probabilities. When M is linear homogenous and quasicon-
cave, one can deduce f0 (θ) > 0 >q 0 (θ) where θ ≡ v/(sx) is market tightness equal to the
5This way of modeling retirement follows Cremer and Pestieau (2003), for example.
8number of open positions per eﬀective job searcher. The probabilities f and q are determined
in equilibrium and are taken as given by individual agents.
After a successful hire, a worker adds 1 to the ﬁrm’s revenues. He gets a wage w which leaves
aj o br e n t1 − w to the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm would thus like to hire more workers but can obtain
them only with probability q for each vacancy. It must further incur a cost κ per vacancy.
When the expected job rent exceeds the cost per vacancy, the ﬁrm creates more jobs and posts
vacancies. As the market becomes increasingly tight, the hiring probability declines until proﬁts
π =[ ( 1− w) · q − κ] · v get exhausted. The zero proﬁt condition (1 − w) · q(θ)=κ determines
market tightness and thereby also ﬁxes the probability f (θ) that the marginal search eﬀort
yields a job oﬀer. While f is ﬁxed in market equilibrium, the individual success probability is
e = sf when the worker spends total eﬀort s. Hence, the employment rate and, thereby, the
unemployment rate 1 − sf depend on individual incentives which, in turn, reﬂect the pension
system’s implicit tax rate τS on job search, to be deﬁned below.




w and determines search incentives. Since the implicit tax rate does not
depend on the wage (see next subsection), the wedge 1 − τS is a constant and plays no role in
wage negotiation. The worker’s gross surplus is w since, by assumption, unemployment neither
yields a replacement income nor utility from leisure. The joint surplus of the match is equal to
the marginal product of labor, w+(1− w)=1 . Given a bargaining power ξ of workers, the ﬁrm
and worker agree on a wage that maximizes the Nash product wξ ·(1 − w)
1−ξ. Bargaining thus
yields a ﬁxed wage that is an average of labor productivity and the worker’s fallback position of
zero. The worker’s job rent before taxes is w = ξ and the ﬁrm’s rent is 1 − w =1− ξ.
2.2 Implicit Tax Rates
How the pension system aﬀects labor market incentives depends on the speciﬁc rules of how
one’s pension is calculated. A rather general rule that nests a number of alternatives is
P = m(x)[tlRp + twex]+p0. (2)
As a ﬁrst case, setting m =0yields a Beveridge type system with a ﬂat pension p0 that is
unrelated to past earnings or contribution payments. The contribution rate t and the ﬂat pension
9p0 must be chosen to equate aggregate revenues and spending to balance the system. Second,
a standard Bismarkian type PAYG system with a tax beneﬁt link emerges from setting p0 =0 ,
Rp =1and m(x)=m0. The pension is linked to past earnings by the rule P = m0 [tl + twex].
It fails to provide strong incentives to postpone retirement beyond the simple fact that paying
contributions over a longer time period accumulates more pension entitlements. There is no
actuarial adjustment of the pension size that would reﬂect the shorter beneﬁt duration. A third
case would provide an actuarial adjustment of the conversion factor m =1 /(1 − x) such that
the increase in pension size appropriately reﬂects the shorter beneﬁt duration when retirement
is postponed. Gruber and Wise (2005) have much emphasized the need for such actuarial
adjustment in order to eliminate the large disincentives for continued work. The ﬁnal reference
case is a fully capital funded system with p0 =0 , Rp = R and m(x)=1 /(1 − x). Contributions
earn the market rate of interest, and pensions are adjusted in an actuarially fair way to take
account of the length of the retirement period. Substituting this investment based pension
rule (1 − x)P = t[lR + wex] into (1) shows that life-time wealth becomes independent of the
parameters of the pension system, C1 + C2/R = l + wex/R. Provided that pension funds earn
the same rate of return as private households do, a fully funded system would provide a perfect
substitute for private savings. Since it does not change private wealth, it remains fully neutral
with respect to labor market incentives.
Substituting the budgets (1) and (2) into the value function yields life-time utility,
V =m a x
l,s,x
(1 − t)l − ϕ(l)+V2/R,
V2 = x(1 − t)we+( 1− x)P − xζ (s) − φ(x),e = s · f, (3)
P = m(x)[tlRp + twex]+p0.
Life-time utility is maximized by choosing hours worked in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da n dj o bs e a r c ha s
well as a retirement date in the second period. The relevant ﬁrst order conditions are




w, τS ≡ t[1 − (1 − x)m], (4)
φ0 (x)=( 1 − t)we− ζ − P +( 1− x) · dP/dx,
dP/dx = t ·
£
mwe + m0 · (lRp + wex)
¤
.
10Working more hours l in the ﬁrst period boosts earnings which get taxed with a statutory rate
t. However, in recognizing the tax beneﬁt rule the individual knows that higher contributions
today add to pension beneﬁts that can be consumed during the retirement period 1−x.T a k i n g
account of this extra gain, individuals really consider only part of the statutory contribution
rate as an implicit tax, τL ≤ t. Without a tax beneﬁtl i n k( m =0 ), contributions are fully
perceived as a tax, τL = t. At the other extreme end, the investment based system not only
pays interest on contributions (Rp = R) but also adjusts in an actuarially fair way the conversion
factor m =1 /(1 − x) to correctly reﬂect the length of the retirement period. As a result, the
implicit tax on current earnings becomes zero, τL =0 . This is just another statement of the
fact that the investment based system does not aﬀect life-time wealth.
Consider next the incentives for job search of older workers near retirement. Marginally
increasing search eﬀort raises the probability sf of ﬁnding a job by f. The worker compares the
alternatives of accepting a job versus remaining unemployed. In case a job is found, he can get a
disposable wage (1 − t)w relative to no income during unemployment. However, the contribution
payments add to pension entitlements at rate m that can be consumed during retirement. Hence,
not all of the additional contributions are lost, only part of them are perceived as a tax. The
implicit tax on job search is only τS <t . Again, the implicit tax is much reduced when the
conversion factor is actuarially adjusted and set at m =1 /(1 − x) to reﬂect the length of the
retirement period. Since there is no interest within the second period, actuarial adjustment
alone would suﬃce to fully eliminate the implicit tax τS. Comparing the two implicit taxes
shows that τL >τ S under a PAYG system that does not pay interest on contributions (Rp =1 ).
This statement explains the ﬁnding in empirical calculations of implicit tax rates which always
turn out higher for younger workers and decline as the date of retirement approaches.6
T h es i m p l ed e ﬁnitions of implicit tax rates on hours wo r k e da n dj o bs e a r c hy i e l da n o t h e r
important insight. Policies that raise the retirement age x without adjusting the conversion
factor m and therefore without raising pension size over the remaining retirement period, may
end up discouraging labor supply of the active workforce. For any given statutory contribution
rate, a later retirement age inﬂates the implicit taxes τL and τS on work eﬀort and job search
when m is ﬁxed. When contributions are paid over a longer time horizon and pensions are
6See Feldstein and Samwick (1992), Disney (2004) and Fenge and Werding (2004), among others.
11received over a shorter period of total life, workers get back less on their contributions and
therefore perceive a larger fraction of them as a discouraging tax.
The retirement date is optimally chosen when the marginal utility cost of continued work is
oﬀset by the marginal gain in life-time income, net of any work related utility cost. The marginal
gain consists of the extra expected disposable earnings net of search costs, (1 − t)we − ζ.T h e
opportunity cost is the foregone pension P that an individual could have consumed during that
time instant. The opportunity cost, however, is reduced by (1 − x)·dP/dx if pension payments
over the remaining retirement time were increased. In a PAYG system with a tax beneﬁtl i n k ,
pensions are increased because the extra contribution payments twe raise the assessment base of
the pension calculation and result in a pension increase of m·twe. However, ﬁscal sustainability
improves because people will collect pensions over a shorter time span when they retire later.
Individuals can be compensated for those savings by an increase in the conversion factor m0
which raises their pension. In both ways, a PAYG system with a tax beneﬁt link can reduce the
opportunity cost of continued work and thereby contain the tendency towards early retirement.
W ec a nn o ws h o wt h a taP A Y Gs y s t e mt h a ta d j u s t st h ec o n v e r s i o nf a c t o ri na na c t u a r i a l l yf a i r
way, i.e. setting it at m =1 /(1 − x) which yields (1 − x)m0 = m, is entirely neutral with
respect to the retirement decision. The pension rule P = mt(lRp + wex) therefore results in
(1 − x)dP/dx = twe + P. The increase in pension beneﬁts during the remaining retirement
period exactly compensates the individual for all savings to the pension system that result from
postponed retirement. The individual optimality condition would be the same as without a
pension system, βφ0 (x)=we− ζ.
The same statements can be phrased in terms of an implicit tax on continued work in the
sense of Gruber and Wise. This eﬀective tax corresponds to the deﬁnition of participation tax
rates in the analysis of discrete labor supply responses as in Immervoll et al. (2007), Kleven and




we − ζ, τR ≡ [τwe+ P − (1 − x)dP/dx]/(we), (5)
where τR collects all changes in the tax beneﬁt system resulting from a marginal increase in
the retirement date. As was noted before, the contribution rate would be fully perceived as a
tax if pensions were ﬂat in the absence of a tax beneﬁtl i n k( m =0 ). With dP/dx =0in this
case, the implicit tax τR = t + P/we would amount to the sum of the contribution and the
12replacement rate! It would thus be very high as the literature mentioned above has pointed
out. A PAYG system with a full tax beneﬁt link and an actuarial adjustment of the conversion
factor, giving (1 − x)dP/dx = twe + P as noted above, or a fully capital funded system with
individual savings accounts, could reduce the implicit tax rate to zero.
3 An Overlapping Generations Model
We employ a computational model of the Austrian economy to investigate how pension reform
in practice could aﬀect labor markets, and how large the impact might possibly be. Savings and
investment result from forward looking intertemporal choice in a small open economy with an
internationally given real interest rate. Savings investment imbalances lead to an endogenously
determined net foreign asset position which must be supported by a trade balance surplus or
deﬁcit. We assume that, prior to reform, the economy follows a balanced growth path. After
reform is implemented, it enters a prolonged period of transition and eventually converges to a
new balanced growth path. The model thus captures transitory as well as long-run eﬀects of
policy reform. The Appendix shortly describes the key parts of the computational model.
In the model, households search for jobs, supply variable hours worked if employed, and
endogenously choose retirement. Households save in their active phase of life to top up public
pensions and sustain their consumption level during retirement. They are subject to life-cycle
speciﬁc mortality risks that increase with age, reﬂecting usual demographic patterns. Capital
accumulation results from intertemporal investment decisions of domestically owned ﬁrms. In
contrast to a competitive output market, the labor market is subject to matching frictions
leading to involuntary unemployment. Compared to Section 2, the calibrated model includes a
rich pattern of life-cycle earnings, savings and consumption. It includes the separate budgets
of general government, unemployment insurance and the earnings linked pension system. The
Appendix describes how pensions are linked to past earnings and thereby determine the implicit
tax rates on labor market activities of prime age workers. Taxes and pensions also imply a
participation tax (implicit retirement tax) of more senior workers. Tables 1 and 2 summarize.
13Table 1: Model Parameters
Production
r 0.050 annual real interest rate
g 0.018 growth rate labor productivity
δ 0.100 depreciation rate of capital
σK 0.800 elasticity of capital labor substitution
Households
σ 0.350 intertemporal elasticity of substitution
νl 0.200 intensive labor supply elasticity
νs 0.200 job search elasticity
 u 1.803 elasticity unemployment rate
 r 0.800 semi-elasticity of retirement
ξ 0.750 bargaining power workers
η 0.500 matching elasticity workers
¯ u 0.065 aggregate unemployment rate
x 0.200 participation rate/retirement date *)
NR/N W 0.331 retiree worker ratio
Welfare System
ρu 0.550 replacement rate unemployment beneﬁts
ρP 0.732 net replacement rate pension beneﬁts
α 0.700 share earnings linked pensions
m 0.036 tax beneﬁt link, last active group
gP 0.004 pension growth rate/indexation
µ0(x) 0.032 sensitivity pension discount/supplement
τR 0.736 implicit participation/retirement tax
Ptot 12.825 gdp share pension expenditure
ZP 2.561 gdp share pension deﬁcit
Legend: µ(x)=( x−xR)µ1+µ2, α = ¯ P/( ¯ P +p0), ρu = b/(wnl),
 u elasticity of unemployment rate w.r.t. replacement rate. *)
Retirement date corresponds to the share of active workers in
the semi-retire d group.
14For the sake of brevity, we discuss only the parameters governing life-cycle labor market
behavior which is the most novel feature of our model. We refer to Altig and Carlstrom (1999)
and Altig et al. (2001) for a discussion of other more standard parameters. The wage elasticity of
hours worked refers to intensive labor supply in (A.5) and is set at a low value vl = .2,r e ﬂecting
the empirical consensus reviewed in Immervoll et al. (2007) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).
A one percent wage increase thus leads to a 0.2 percent increase in hours worked.
The impact of the ﬁscal system on the unemployment rate is based on recent econometric
evidence for OECD countries. The estimate of Scarpetta (1996) implies that a 10% increase in
the replacement ratio of unemployment beneﬁts leads to an unemployment rate higher by about
1.3 percentage points. This coeﬃcient compares with an estimate of 1.7 in Layard et al. (1991),
1.1 in Nickel (1997) and roughly the same in Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). Holmlund (1998)
reviews the literature. Setting the elasticity of the search eﬀort cost at νs = ϕ0
S/(sϕ00
S)=.2
implies a long-run general equilibrium response of our model to a 10% increase in the replacement
ratio equal to 1.8 (coeﬃcient  u in Table 1) which is at the upper end of these estimates. This is
meant to reﬂect the evidence in Daveri and Tabellini (2000) which implies a rather strong eﬀect
of labor taxes on unemployment. As part of our sensitivity analysis, we will check robustness
with respect to a lower value of this elasticity. -Other important parameters determining search
equilibrium are the matching elasticity of worker’s search activity and bargaining strength. The
vast majority of empirical studies estimates the elasticity of the matching function with respect
to the unemployed around η = .5 (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, pp.520 and 534). In the
absence of other direct information, we set the bargaining power of workers at ξ = .75.T h i s
means that the wage falls short of the marginal product of labor to a smaller extent, leaving
only a relatively modest job rent to ﬁrms. In this case, the results of Hosios (1990) imply that
equilibrium unemployment is ineﬃciently high, creating ﬁrst order welfare gains from reducing
the unemployment rate.
Finally, to parameterize retirement behavior, we rely on the estimates of Boersch-Supan
(2000) for Germany. Given the similarity of pension systems, we take this semi-elasticity for
Germany as representative for Austria as well. Börsch-Supan (2000) estimates that a decrease
in beneﬁts by 12% would reduce the retirement probability of the 60 years old from 39.3%
to 28.1%. This amounts to a semi-elasticity of retirement equal to 0.93. However, this value
15decreases with age. For 64 year-olds, it is estimated to be 0.45. These estimates are in line with
Costa (1995) and Spataro (2005) who ﬁnd values of 0.73 and 0.6, respectively. We set a base
case value of εR =0 .8 and will reduce this value to half as part of our sensitivity analysis. Most
other parameters in Table 1 reﬂect macroeconomic and institutional data for Austria.
Table 2: Life-Cycle Earnings and Unemployment
Cohorts 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99
A g e G r o u p s 1234 5 * )678
population share n 0.191 0.189 0.181 0.163 0.139 0.097 0.039 0.002
labor prod. θ 1.500 1.859 2.114 2.308 2.340 - - -
net wage wn 0.566 0.525 0.499 0.480 0.499 - - -
wage tax rate tw 0.194 0.239 0.267 0.285 0.261 - - -
tax beneﬁtl i n k m 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.036 0.036 - - -
eﬀ.pens.contrib. ˆ ts 0.170 0.170 0.135 -0.008 -0.102 - - -
unempl.rate u 0.068 0.055 0.060 0.068 0.116 - - -
av. income ¯ y 0.820 0.948 1.024 1.070 0.865 0.793 0.779 0.734
per cap.assets ¯ a 9.215 11.732 12.285 11.433 10.678 9.025 8.649 8.448
marg.prop.cons. mpc 3.703 4.986 6.039 7.322 8.740 11.569 12.624 13.069
Legend: mpc marginal propensity to consume out of life-time wealth, na = Na/N population
shares. *) The participation rate in the semi-retired group is 20 p.c., the unemployment rate
refers to the active part only.
Table 2 reports life-cycle information. The distribution of the population over age groups is
based on mortality data. The survival rates importantly inﬂuence the marginal propensity to
consume out of life-time wealth, and thereby life-cycle savings behavior. They increase strongly
for very old age groups. As mortality rates rise and the end of life becomes a more probable
event, agents wish to consume a larger fraction of their resources. Per capita assets are hump
shaped and decline towards the end of the life-cycle. Presumably reﬂecting the importance of
seniority pay in Austria, the skill proﬁle is rising over the entire earnings history. The pattern of
net wages additionally reﬂects the eﬀect of progressive wage taxes. Finally, Table 1 reports an
unemployment rate of 6.5% on average. This aggregate number hides a signiﬁcant heterogeneity
among diﬀerent age groups. Life-cycle unemployment rates follow an inverse hump-shaped
16pattern. With 11.6%, the unemployment rate of people near retirement is about double the rate
of prime age workers in their thirties when it is lowest with a rate of only 5.5%. The life-cycle
pattern of the implicit contribution tax will be discussed below.
4 Pension Reform in Austria
4.1 Recent Policy Initiatives
Pension reform in Austria is particularly interesting for several reasons.7 The Austrian pension
system was subject to a large imbalance and clearly unsustainable prior to reform. In 2000,
Austria had the highest GDP share of pension spending in the EU15 equal to 14.5% and it
was expected to increase to 18.1% in 2035 (European Commission, 2003b). Five years later,
after several important reforms, the European Union projected a decline of pension spending
by 1.2 percentage points, from 13.4% in 2004 to 12.2% in 2050. Pension spending in our model
amounts to 12.8% of GDP which reﬂects the estimates based on legislation dating to the end of
December 2003. Contributions were far from suﬃcient to fully cover pension payouts, leading
to a deﬁc i to fm o r et h a n2 . 5 %o fG D Pt ob eﬁnanced out of general tax revenue (see Table
1). Clearly, recent pension reform in Austria was among the more courageous and far reaching
in Europe, resembling much of what we have analyzed in the preceding section. Furthermore,
early retirement and low labor market participation of older workers were particularly widespread
phenomena in Austria. In 2003, the average retirement age was about 58 years, compared to
statutory retirement age of 65 for men and 60 for women. The employment rate in the age group
of 55-64 was thus a mere 28.8% in comparison to an average of 41% for the EU25 (European
Commission, 2007a). In contrast, participation rates among younger workers were European
average or even better.
Austria runs a PAYG system that covers more than 90% of the labor force. Occupational
pension schemes and individual capital funded pensions play only a rather minor role. The con-
tribution rate amounts to 22.8% of gross salaries. Workers pay 10.25%, the remaining 12.55%
are ﬁnanced by employers. However, contributions are paid only up to an income ceiling. Ac-
7Pension reform in Austria is discussed, among others, in OECD (2005), European Commission (2004 and
2006a,b), Knell et al. (2006), Felderer et al. (2006) and Hofer and Koman (2006).
17cording to wage income statistics of 2005, wage income was 94.4 bn. Euro (3.769 mio cases).
Incomes below the contribution ceiling account for 75 percent of the wage bill (70.4 bn Euro or
3.471 mio cases). This would yield an eﬀective statutory contribution rate of 17% (22.8×0.75).
Pension levels are rather generous. They are assessed on the basis of individual past earnings
where the ﬁrst-time pension is given by the product of the (accumulated) accrual rate times the
pension assessment base. Prior to the 2003 reform, two points could be added to the accrual
rate for each year of earnings so that after 40 years of employment a maximum accrual rate of
80% of the assessment base was obtained. The Austrian pension formula thus results in a gross
replacement rate equal to 64% of average earnings which implies a net of tax replacement rate
around 80% (European Commission, 2007a).
Up to 2004, the assessment base consisted of an average of the best 15 years of earnings,
meaning that younger workers could not inﬂuence their expected pension if they earned more.
Calculating average earnings over a short period of time means that each year of eligible earnings
weighs much more heavily in determining the pension. In our model, we capture this institutional
feature by setting the tax beneﬁtl i n kma to zero for young workers and relatively high for older
ones so that we replicate the observed average pension level at retirement. We interpret the
participation rate of 0.2 as the average retirement age in group 5 (60 to 70 year olds). Given
that wage proﬁles rise over the entire working life, the best 15 years of earnings would start with
age 37 which corresponds to a share of 30% of time and earnings in this group. We thus set the
value of ma in group 3 (40-50 years old) at .3 × .036 = .0108 w h e r et h ev a l u ef o ro l d e rw o r k e r s
equal to .036 is chosen relatively high to replicate the observed ﬁr s tt i m ep e n s i o n . F o rt h i s
reason, the contribution tax is equal to the full statutory contribution rate of younger workers
while their older colleagues get a signiﬁcant subsidy, see Table 2. A subsidy to certain groups,
especially to older workers, is not unusual (see the calculations in Feldstein and Samwick, 1992).
The subsidy in part reﬂects the generosity and substantial deﬁcit of the Austrian system which
results in higher taxes elsewhere. An extension of the assessment period to life-time earnings
establishes a uniform level of the tax beneﬁt link for all groups that would have to be reduced
appropriately to yield the same starting pension. Such a change reduces the implicit tax of
young workers while it raises the tax (or cuts the subsidy) of older ones.
Austria recently initiated several reforms in expectation of large imbalances of the system.
18The main reasons are an increase in life-expectancy by about 4.4 years, a fertility rate much
below 2 until 2050, and a trend towards early retirement (European Commission, 2006b). These
developments are projected to lead to a doubling of the old age dependency ratio (ratio of people
65+ over ages 15 to 64), increasing from 25% in 2005 to 51% in 2050. In addition, the retirement
age of men fell from more than 62 in the early 70s to 59 in 2003, or 58.8 as an average of men
and women, in comparison to 61.3 for the EU15 (European Commission, 2007b). To restore
sustainability, the pension reforms of 2000, 2003 and 2004 introduced several measures that
restricted or even abolished eligibility for early retirement, survivors and disability pensions. In
2000, some early retirement options were scrapped altogether. For the remaining schemes, the
early retirement age was raised by 18 months up to 61.5 years for men and 56.5 for women.
The pension schemes for all occupational groups were fully harmonized in 2004, implying a
much reduced generosity of civil servant pensions. Contribution rates were fully harmonized to
a uniform statutory rate of 22.8%. The personal contributions of farmers and self-employed are
subsidized with co-payments ﬁnanced out of general tax.
On a more fundamental level, and with some extended phasing in period, Austrian reform
of the PAYG system established individual pension accounts for all occupational groups and
individuals born after 1955: (i) The assessment period is extended from the best 15 years to
life-time earnings in 2004. At the same time, the accrual rate was reduced from 2 to 1.78%
in 2003. According to the guiding formula 45/65/80, the pension system guarantees a pension
equal to 80% of the assessment base after 45 insurance years at the standard retirement age of
65 years. (ii) Each year, 1.78% of individual earnings are added to the individual account as new
entitlements. Accumulated entitlements are paid an implicit interest rate equal to the growth
rate of average gross earnings. (iii) Relative to the statutory retirement age of 65, variable
retirement is allowed within a pension corridor of ages 62 and 68. Pension discounts for each
year of early and credits for each year of delayed retirement amount to 4.2% of the assessment
base per annum. In the extreme cases, beneﬁts can be reduced by 15% and increased by 12.6%
relative to the normal pension that one would have received at the statutory retirement age.
Entitlement is restricted to persons of at least 37.5 years of pensionable service. (iv) Existing
pensions are inﬂation indexed. Previously, the system required that average pensions should
have grown at the same speed as average wages, both net of social security contributions. Knell
19et al. (2006, p. 4) argued, however, that adjustment of average pensions reﬂected not much more
than consumer price inﬂation as a result of ongoing changes in the composition of pensioners.
Our model is well suited to analyze the quantitative eﬀects of many of these reform measures.
In the next subsection, we ﬁrst consider the impact of a general change in retirement preferences.
We scale down the shift parameter in the retirement cost function to an extent that the average
retirement age increases by roughly 2 years in long-run equilibrium. This would reverse about
two thirds of the decline in average retirement age that occurred in Austria since the early 70s.
In subsection 4.3, we investigate the potential consequences of four scenarios:
(1) We analyze the extension of the calculation period for pension assessment from the best
15 years to the entire earnings history. At the same time, the accrual rate for entitlement
accumulation is cut to an extent that keeps, in the absence of behavioral response, the initial
earnings linked pension ﬁxed. In equilibrium, pension size will increase, should people start to
work more and retire later and thereby acquire more entitlements.
(2) Then we consider a strengthening of the tax beneﬁt link. In our model, 70 percent of
overall pension income initially stems from earnings linked pensions, the remaining part accrues
in the form of ﬂat beneﬁts. We raise the share of earnings linked pensions to 80 percent and,
taking initial labor market behavior as given, compensate by a cut in lump-sum beneﬁts to keep
total pension size constant. This scenario is interpreted as a ‘harmonization’ of the system which
subjects a larger part of the population to the same earnings based pension rules.
(3) Wage indexation of pension beneﬁts is replaced by price indexation. Although pensions
were, in principle, increasing along with wages prior to reform, wage indexation was far from
complete. We thus start from a situation where pensions were allowed to grow only by a quarter
of the general wage growth rate. By moving to price indexation, this growth rate is reduced to
zero so that pensions remain constant in real terms.
(4) The ﬁnal scenario refers to arguably the most important policy change in Austria, the
increase in pension discounts and supplements for early and late retirement. In the simulation
model, a postponement of retirement by one year (corresponding to an increase in the partic-
ipation rate of age group 5, the 60 to 70 year olds, from 0.2 to 0.3) yields an increase in the
ﬁrst time pension equal to about 3%. We consider the impact of moving to a 4.2% pension
adjustment with respect to one year of earlier or later retirement. The OECD (2005) has argued
20for even higher actuarial adjustments. We consider the consequences of such a further step to
gauge the importance of retirement incentives.
In all cases, the policy scenarios are not revenue neutral when the behavioral response kicks
in, and result in larger or smaller deﬁcits of the pension system. It is assumed that any deﬁcits
or surpluses are covered out of general tax revenue by an adjustment of the wage tax rate.
4.2 Impact of Retirement Trend
Table 3 reports the long-run impact of a shift in preferences leading to delayed retirement of
about two years. Obviously, the direct consequence is an increase in aggregate labor supply on
the extensive margin. The expansion of the labor force by 3.7%, without any further reaction,
raises the worker retiree ratio and thereby more than halves the deﬁcit of the PAYG system.
Even though later retirement leads to higher per capita pensions, the reduction in the number
of retirees dominates.8 The lower deﬁcit together with a growing wage tax base creates room for
a substantial tax cut. Lower tax rates stimulate hours worked and job search activities of prime
age workers which magniﬁes the aggregate labor supply response, leading to a total increase of
5.5%. Labor income tax rates are reduced by a factor of .89 for all age groups. Tax rates on
prime age workers are down by 2.2 to 3.3 percentage points while the tax load on pensioners falls
between 1.7 to 3 points. People are thus not only working longer on average, but also search
more intensively for jobs if they are unemployed. The aggregate unemployment rate therefore
shrinks by more than half a point. In an open economy with a ﬁxed real interest rate, investment
and output all expand in line with aggregate labor supply by the same relative amount, giving
a long-run level eﬀect on GDP of 5.5%.
In an earnings based system, higher earnings at younger ages increase beneﬁts during retire-
ment. However, when people retire later, pension rules lead to even higher per capita beneﬁts
to compensate for paying contributions longer and claiming beneﬁts over a shorter period. The
net pension replacement rate substantially increases from 73 to 78% of the last net of tax salary.
Of course, the higher pension is consumed over a shorter period when retirement is postponed.
8The participation tax rate τ
R measures not only the net ﬁscal burden to the individual of a marginal increase
in the retirement date, but also the net ﬁscal gain to the public sector. A high participation tax rate thus means
that the ﬁscal balance strongly improves when retirement occurs later.
21At the margin, however, the opportunity cost of retirement is increased by a higher replacement
rate which leads to a slightly higher implicit retirement tax in the sense of Gruber and Wise.
Table 3: Retirement Trend, Long-Run
Scenarios ISS Retire
Absolute Values:
Wage Tax, scaling 1.000 φ 0.885
Contribution Rate 0.170 ts 0.170
Implicit Pension Tax *) 0.135 ˆ ts
3 0.137
Implicit Retirement Tax 0.736 τR 0.754
Retirement Date 0.200 x 0.400
Pension Repl. Rate 0.732 ρP 0.780
Unemployment Rate 0.065 ¯ u 0.059
Pension Def., % GDP 2.561 ZP 0.929
Pension Spend., % GDP 12.825 Ptot 11.176
Percentage Changes:
Labor Force NW 3.689
Labor Demand LD 5.471
Gross.Dom.Prod., GDP F 5.471
Legend: *) Implicit tax on group 3 (41-50years).
A ﬁnal interesting result refers to the employment prospects of younger and older workers.
Tables 1 and 2 show that older workers near retirement face an unemployment rate of 11.6%
which is way above the average rate of 6.5% in Austria. This above average unemployment
rate much erodes the expected wage income obtained from active work and, in our model,
represents some incentive to retire early. The question is whether postponed retirement and,
thus, the associated increase in labor market participation, necessarily leads to an even higher
unemployment rate among older workers. Our model says no. Conditional on labor market
participation, older workers face much improved incentives for job search due to substantially
reduced wage taxation which contributes to a lower unemployment rate in this age group as
well. However, the reduction in the unemployment rate among older workers is much smaller
22than for younger age groups. In contrast, the unemployment rate among younger workers falls
by roughly 0.8 percentage points.
4 . 3 E c o n o m i cI m p a c to fR e c e n tR e f o r m
We now investigate the eﬀects of Austrian pension reform as discussed in section 4.1. The policy
scenarios in the last four columns of Table 4 must be understood cumulatively, one on top of
the other. Section 4.3.6 below discusses the generational and aggregate welfare eﬀects.
4.3.1 Lengthening Assessment Period
We ﬁrst turn to the extension of the assessment period to entire life-time earnings, giving a
uniform value of the tax beneﬁtl i n kma = m for all groups, instead of the initial pattern shown
in Table 2. To avoid an unintended change in the generosity of pensions, we scale the level of
the tax beneﬁtc o e ﬃcient such that, for given labor market behavior, it yields the same level of
aggregate pension spending. To this end, the tax beneﬁtc o e ﬃcient is raised from zero to 0.017
for the youngest age group, and reduced from 0.036 to this same value for the oldest (partially)
active group. In general equilibrium, pension levels will change to some extent in response to the
induced labor market response. Any emerging deﬁcit or surplus is oﬀset by scaling the income
tax on wages and pensions.
A reduction of the accrual rate generally weakens the tax beneﬁt link and raises the implicit
tax rates for older workers in their best 15 years of earnings. By way of contrast, the extension
of the calculation period allows younger workers early in their career to participate in the tax
beneﬁt link which reduces the implicit tax character of their contributions. In our simulations,
the policy initiative cuts the implicit tax rate from the youngest age group of people in their
twenties by 3 percentage points, from 17 to about 14%. At the same time, the reduction of the
accrual rate imposes a larger implicit tax on older workers in their best 15 years of earnings.
For example, the active part of age group 5, corresponding to people in their early sixties, has
actually received an implicit subsidy on their contributions equal to 10.2% of earnings, reﬂecting
the deﬁcit of the system and the remarkable generosity of pensions. The subsidy is turned into
an eﬀective tax of 3.5% as a result of the reduction in the tax beneﬁtc o e ﬃcient. The eﬀective
23subsidy to the fourth age group, the 50 to 60 year olds, is similarly turned into an eﬀective tax of
8.3%. Consequently, the labor market activity of these groups is discouraged. This part of the
Austrian reform package should thus have not so much encouraged work incentives on average,
but rather incentives of younger workers at the expense of older ones.
Table 4: Parametric Pension Reform, Long-Run
Scenarios ISS Length Harm Index Fair
Absolute Values:
Wage Tax, scaling 1.000 φ 1.004 0.987 0.976 0.940
Implicit Pension Tax i) 0.135 ˆ ts
3 0.113 0.105 0.106 0.107
Implicit Retirement Tax 0.736 τR 0.756 0.743 0.744 0.709
Retirement Date 0.200 x 0.196 0.216 0.214 0.288
Pension Repl. Ratio 0.732 ρP 0.765 0.772 0.771 0.795
Unemployment Rate, % 6.467 ¯ u 6.469 6.334 6.285 6.116
Pension Def., % GDP 2.561 ZP 2.554 2.374 2.152 1.663
Pension Spend., % GDP 12.825 Ptot 12.811 12.635 12.411 11.916
Net For. Ass., % GDP -19.500 DF -17.155 -21.290 -15.962 -29.604
Percentage Changes:
Labor Force NW -0.071 0.288 0.260 1.632
Labor Demand LD -0.296 0.645 0.717 2.669
Gross.Dom.Prod., GDP F -0.296 0.645 0.717 2.669
Aggr. Consumption C -0.254 0.662 1.001 2.628
Aggr. Assets A 0.351 0.296 1.353 0.665
Welfare changes, % GDP
Present Generations EV O -0.081 0.179 0.096 0.792
Future Generations EV Y -0.029 0.121 0.147 0.471
Aggregate Gains EV -0.110 0.300 0.242 1.263
Legend: i) Implicit tax on age group 3 (41-50years); Scenarios: Columns report
cumulative eﬀects. (Length) Lengthening assessment period, (Harm) harmo-
nization (extend coverage of earnings linked pensions), (Index) from wage to
price indexation, (Fair) more actuarial fairness.
The changes in the implicit tax component of PAYG contributions is reﬂected in the labor
24supply response documented in Figure 1. While Figure 1 shows the cumulative impact of the
complete reform, the life-cycle pattern is clearly dominated by this ﬁrst scenario. In our model,
hours worked of active generations depend on the real wage net of eﬀective tax rates. The
Figure illustrates how the lengthening of the calculation period reduces eﬀective taxes and thus
stimulates hours worked and search activity of the young, and how it discourages labor supply
of senior workers. The reduction in hours worked among the elderly is rather large in size,
compared to the more modest but still substantial increases among the young. The isolated
eﬀect from extending the calculation period is +1.3% for people in their 30s, and -3.6% for the
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Fig. 1: Life-Cycle Labor Supply, Percent Changes
J o bs e a r c hm u c hd e p e n d so nt h es t r e n g t ho ft h et a xb e n e ﬁt link which raises future beneﬁts
for any extra wage income created by switching into a job. In Austria, this channel remains
relatively weak, however, since periods of unemployment to a large part also count for future
pensions. Compared to hours worked, the response of job search and unemployment rates is
thus smaller. The eﬀects are stronger for workers near retirement but are much discounted for
people in their early career. Furthermore, the life-cycle pattern of the unemployment response
reﬂects the fact that the policy initiative raises the tax on old and cuts it for younger workers,
thereby shifting labor market incentives from the old to the young. If this scenario is viewed in
isolation as in column ‘Length’ of Table 4, the rate of unemployment among the 30-40 years old
shrinks by -0.14% while it increases for workers in their 50s and 60s by +.32% in both groups.
25The unemployment rates in Figure 2 reﬂect the additional inﬂuences of the other reform steps
which scale down unemployment rates across the board. Therefore, in the end, the complete
reform cuts unemployment rates of younger age groups substantially more than for older ones.
Given the oﬀsetting impact on younger and older workers, the aggregate unemployment rate in
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Fig. 2: Life-Cycle Unemployment, Absolute
4.3.2 Strengthening Tax BeneﬁtL i n k
An important element of Austrian pension reform was to subject certain groups of the population
such as civil servants and farmers who have largely received ﬂat pensions, to the earnings linked
rules of a ‘harmonized’ system. We can mimic this by assuming that the representative household
receives a larger share of earnings linked pension income, and a correspondingly smaller share
of a basic ﬂat pension. We shift up accrual rates m and cut the ﬂat pension subject to two
constraints: (i) the share of the earnings linked pension is raised from 70 to 80%, and (ii) agents
receive the same pension at the start of retirement when individual behavior is kept constant.
The uniform accrual rate m must thus be raised from 1.75 to 2.02% of expected wage income. To
the extent that people respond with increased labor market activity to accumulate more pension
entitlements, beneﬁt levels may be higher in equilibrium. Column ‘Harm’ of Table 4 reports the
cumulative impact when harmonization is imposed on top of lengthening the assessment period.
The incremental eﬀects are seen when comparing to column ‘Length’.
26Strengthening the tax beneﬁtl i n ki sa no b v i o u se ﬃciency improvement. The implicit tax
on hours worked is reduced across all age groups. The policy change also strengthens the
incentives for job search because, with a stronger tax beneﬁt link, the income gain from accepting
employment translates into a larger increase in future pension beneﬁts. Finally, the tax beneﬁt
link weakly boosts participation incentives of older workers, as is shown by a slightly reduced
participation tax. Note that already in the initial equilibrium is the size of the pension to some
extent sensitive to the retirement date. Since the size of the earnings linked part in total pension
income is now larger, a given marginal delay in retirement translates into a larger future pension
gain (term µ0
p in the implicit retirement tax in A.5). Workers are thus more keen to postpone
retirement. Similarly, any given wage income translates into larger future pensions when the
accrual rate m is higher. A given marginal delay in retirement and thereby marginally prolonged
contribution payments again get rewarded with a higher present value of future pension income
(term µ0
w times wage base in A.5).
The results in Table 4 support these arguments. The retirement date is postponed which
raises the participation rate from .196 to .216 and thereby augments the increase in the workforce
by .36 percentage points. The number of pensioners and therefore the dependency ratio is
correspondingly reduced so that sustainability of the system improves. The small decline in
pension spending, made possible by a smaller number of retirees rather than a cut in per capita
pensions, slightly reduces the deﬁcit and creates room for a small wage tax cut which further
magniﬁes labor market incentives. The increase in hours worked and the small reduction in the
unemployment rate both reinforce eﬀective labor supply beyond the mere participation eﬀect
and boost GDP by 0.6%.
4.3.3 Moving to Price Indexation
The labor market impact of eliminating (the rather ineﬀective) wage indexation of pensions is
not immediately apparent and reﬂects partly oﬀsetting forces. Doing away with wage indexation
has two direct eﬀects. First, it reduces signiﬁcantly the shadow price of pension entitlements.
When pensions grow at a slower rate from the date of retirement onwards, the present value of
expected future pension income per unit of the starting pension must fall. Therefore, the value of
additional pension beneﬁts from working longer hours and generating more earnings at younger
27ages is much discounted. Such devaluation signiﬁcantly raises the implicit tax component of
PAYG contributions and thereby discourages job search and hours worked. Removing wage
indexation simply makes the system less generous from an individual perspective. Even more
importantly, the devaluation of pension entitlements due to the lower shadow price is likely to
induce early retirement. If pension rules are already sensitive with respect to the retirement
date, people can raise pension income upon retiring later. However, if the present value of
the gains from obtaining a higher starting pension is reduced, people gain less from postponing
retirement. The scenario thus holds a potential for early retirement. Second, when pensions grow
slower than wages, they get relatively less generous during retirement. The resulting savings in
aggregate pension spending are, after all, the main motivation for this policy change. If these
savings come true, the lower deﬁcit in the pension system would allow for wage tax cuts which
would stimulate work, search and old age participation.
Column ‘Index’ in Table 4 reports the long-run results from eliminating wage indexation of
pensions. Labor market incentives on prime age workers change in oﬀsetting ways. First, the
pension savings reduce the PAYG deﬁcit and allow for wage tax cuts. Second, the devaluation
of entitlements when pensions grow slower after the date of retirement, increases the implicit
p e n s i o nt a x .I no u rs i m u l a t i o n s ,t h eﬁrst eﬀect dominates and slightly stimulates hours worked
and job search on prime age workers. As a third eﬀect, the reduced shadow price of pension
entitlements makes a delay in retirement less attractive. Therefore, the participation rate in
group 5 slightly declines from 21.6 to 21.4 which reduces the labor force to a small extent. Nev-
ertheless, due to the beneﬁcial eﬀects on labor market activity of prime age workers, abolishing
wage indexation weakly stimulates eﬀective labor demand and raises the GDP eﬀect from .65 to
.72%. The outcome, however, hinges on the system already exhibiting some degree of actuarial
fairness in the initial state. If late retirement were not rewarded with pension supplements, then
a devaluation of pension claims could have no eﬀect on the retirement decision. This would
avoid the early retirement eﬀect and result in a somewhat larger GDP gain.
Another interesting point is the signiﬁcant increase in life-cycle savings. The transition from
wage to price indexation leads to a relative decline of pension income of the very old, relative to
wage income in active periods of work. The anticipation of lower pension growth during old age
therefore leads to a considerable, oﬀsetting increase in private savings to ensure old age living
28standards per capita. Compared to the initial equilibrium, aggregate private assets are by 1.35%
higher in the long-run. In a small open economy, the interest rate and thus capital intensity are
internationally determined and are independent of domestic policy shocks. Therefore, investment
simply parallels the increase in aggregate labor supply. Excess savings lead to increased capital
exports in the form of international portfolio investments. In consequence, the country’s net
foreign debt of almost 20% is reduced by almost 4 percentage points of GDP.
4.3.4 Increasing Actuarial Fairness
The most important element of Austrian pension reform may have been the revision of the pen-
sion formula to assure a larger degree of actuarial fairness. In our initial equilibrium, postponing
retirement by one year raised a person’s earnings linked pension by 3%. In this scenario, we raise
- on top of the other reform elements - the pension increase to 4.2% per year as it was recently
introduced in Austria. The last column of Table 4 reports the long-run results. Comparing to
column ‘Index’ reveals the diﬀerential eﬀect, while comparison to ‘ISS’ referring to the initial
steady state shows the cumulative impact of the total package.
Introducing more actuarial fairness has two immediate eﬀects. It substantially reduces the
participation tax rate from 74 to 71%. When people on average retire later, they collect larger
beneﬁts which signiﬁcantly raises the pension replacementr a t e .T a b l e4s h o w st h a tt h ep o l i c y
initiative, by inducing late retirement, boosts the participation rate in 5, corresponding to the
60 to 70 years old, from 21 to 29%. Higher old age participation expands the labor force by
about 1.8%, or 1.6% in total. Since pensioners are a much smaller group to begin with, the
same absolute change means a much larger percentage change which amounts to -4.1%. The
large decline in the dependency ratio obviously is a key factor to restore ﬁnancial sustainability
of the system. Despite of the fact that per capita pensions are signiﬁcantly larger as a result
of late retirement supplements, the much lower take-up rate reduces aggregate spending from
12.4 to 11.9% of GDP. These savings shave oﬀ half a percentage point of GDP from the PAYG
deﬁcit. The corresponding ﬁscal savings ﬁnance a substantial tax cut. Tax rates on wage and
pension incomes are scaled down by a factor of .94, implying a reduction in tax rates of up to 1
percentage point (or 1.7 points for the total reform) for top earners in their ﬁfties.
Labor market behavior of prime age workers is mainly driven by eﬀective wage and contri-
29bution tax rates. Given constant statutory contribution rates and a constant tax beneﬁtl i n k ,
the eﬀective contribution tax is not much changed for prime age workers. Although lower taxes
on pensions would imply a larger present value per unit of pension claim, these gains lie in the
more distant future due to postponed retirement, and are thus discounted more heavily. For this
reason, the eﬀective contribution tax ends up being slightly higher, but the eﬀect on the total
eﬀective tax rates on work and job search are dwarfed by the cut in wage taxes. The lower wage
tax stimulates signiﬁcantly the labor market activity of prime age workers and, thus, reinforces
the extensive labor supply response on account of postponed retirement. The growth of the
work force jumps from .26 to 1.6% as a result of late retirement incentives, and the total eﬀect
on aggregate labor supply and GDP rises from .7 to 2.7%.
Table 4 also points to important repercussions of pension reform for aggregate life-cycle
savings. Postponed retirement which comes along with a signiﬁcant increase in the pension
replacement rate, reduces the need for life-cycle savings for two reasons. First, the retirement
period is shorter so that individuals need to save less to sustain living standards. Second, the
higher pension replacement rate similarly reduces the need for private savings. While private
consumption growth jumps from 1 to 2.6%, the increase in household sector ﬁnancial wealth is
reduced from 1.4 to 0.7%. The net foreign asset position accordingly deteriorates.
To sum up, recent pension reform in Austria could add around 2.7% of GDP in the long-run.
The major gains in terms of aggregate consumption and GDP stem from strengthening actuarial
fairness by raising pension supplements for late retirement, and from pension harmonization by
including a larger part of the population in the earnings linked system. The reform shifts labor
market activity in terms of hours worked and employment rates from old to younger prime age
workers. While the unemployment rate in the most senior part of the workforce of 60 years
plus remains virtually unchanged, it declines by roughly half a percentage point among younger
workers, leading to a decline in the aggregate unemployment rate from 6.5 to 6.1%. The gains
in labor market prospects are rather unevenly distributed over the life-cycle.
4.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Given our focus on intensive and extensive margins of labor supply, hours worked, job search
and retirement, we want to check the robustness of results on those behavioral margins. Table
305 shows how the long-run impact of policy reform changes when the model is calibrated on
the same data base but with diﬀerent behavioral elasticities. The base case column repeats
the results from the last column of Table 4. Since the empirical literature ﬁnds a very low
and in some cases insigniﬁcant wage elasticity of hours worked, we consider in the next column
t h ec a s eo fﬁxed hours. We ﬁnd that the long-run GDP gains is reduced from 2.7 to 2.3%.
Interestingly, the halving of the search elasticity has much less impact. To gauge the size of this
parameter value, we compute in a separate exercise that an increase in the replacement ratio of
unemployment beneﬁts equal to 10% would raise the unemployment rate by about 1.4%, instead
of 1.8% with the base case parameters listed in Table 1. Quite expectedly, a smaller job search
elasticity somewhat dampens the impact on the unemployment rate which leads to a slightly
lower GDP eﬀect of 2.54 instead of 2.7% in the long-run.
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis
Base Case Parameter Values ISS Base Hours Search Retire
vl = .2, vs = .2 and  r = .8 Case vl =0 vs = .1  r = .4
Absolute Values:
Wage Tax, scaling 1.000 φ 0.940 0.944 0.942 0.962
Retirement Date 0.200 x 0.288 0.292 0.288 0.243
Unemployment Rate, Gr.1, % 6.780 u1 6.289 6.312 6.421 6.428
Unemployment Rate, av., % 6.467 ¯ u 6.116 6.160 6.219 6.220
Pension Def., % GDP 2.561 ZP 1.663 1.700 1.676 1.968
Pension Spend., % GDP 12.825 Ptot 11.916 11.948 11.930 12.225
Net For. Ass., % GDP -19.500 DF -29.604 -30.772 -29.183 -21.417
Percentage Changes:
Hours Worked, Gr.1 l1 1.338 0.001 1.333 1.229
Hours Worked, av. ¯ l 0.515 0.000 0.503 0.436
Labor Force NW 1.632 1.698 1.622 0.796
Gross.Dom.Prod., GDP F 2.669 2.336 2.540 1.476
Aggr. Consumption C 2.628 2.163 2.513 1.629
Legend: (Base) Base case results, (Hours) Fixed hours of work, (Search) Low job
search intensity, (Retire) Low retirement elasticity.
31Since the overall impact of the policy scenario is mainly dominated by induced retirement
behavior, any change in the retirement elasticity is bound to have a larger eﬀect. Halving the
elasticity almost cuts in half the GDP gain as well. The main change comes from the impact on
the workforce. With a lower elasticity, workers postpone retirement to a much lesser extent so
that the participation rate among the 60 to 70 years old increases only half as much compared to
the base case. The ﬁscal gains are much reduced so that the possible wage tax cuts are much less
generous. Consequently, the reduction in the unemployment rate is also smaller. The sensitivity
analysis once again veriﬁes that the retirement margin may be the most important channel for
macroeconomic eﬀects of pension reform especially if the degree of actuarial fairness is changed.
4.3.6 Generational Welfare Eﬀects
We compute the intergenerational and aggregate welfare eﬀects of policy reform in terms of
equivalent variations of life-time wealth. Since we analytically aggregate individual agents into
diﬀerent life-cycle groups, we can state the generational welfare eﬀects per capita of eight dif-
ferent preexisting age groups and of all new generations born at dates after the policy shock, as
is shown in Figure 3. To obtain the aggregate welfare eﬀect at the date of the policy change,
we ﬁrst compute for each scenario the complete equilibrium time paths, starting from histor-
ical conditions and ending up with long-run equilibrium values. We then add the equivalent
variations of all presently living generations and convert this wealth measure into a permanent
income stream of equal present value which can be compared to other ﬂows. We thus obtain in
Table 4 the welfare change EV O of present generations, expressed in percent of GDP. To obtain
the welfare change EV Y of future generations, we add the discounted equivalent variations of
new agents born in the period following the policy shock or later, and appropriately weigh them
by their population weights at birth. To express the welfare change in percent of GDP as in
Table 4, we again convert the resulting amount of wealth into permanent income with equal
present value. Adding up the two numbers gives the aggregate welfare change of present and
future generations. Note that the numbers plotted in Figure 3 are expressed per capita and in
percent of life-time wealth while the numbers in Table 4 are aggregate values in percent of GDP.
There are several reasons for welfare changes in our model with a frictional labor market,
but perfectly competitive output and capital markets. To interpret the welfare results, we
32must also keep in mind our focus on labor income taxes and the pension system while other
tax revenue is raised lump-sum. As a rough guideline, policies will yield welfare gains if they
succeed to stimulate hours worked, job search, and old age participation (late retirement) since
they are suppressed by eﬀective tax wedges on these behavioral margins. Of course, labor market
activities are most directly enhanced by reducing the respective labor tax wedges. Furthermore,
since the bargaining power of workers is assumed to be larger then the matching elasticity of
job search, equilibrium unemployment is ineﬃciently high. Policies thus yield ﬁrst order welfare
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Fig. 3: Generational Welfare Changes
The aggregate welfare results in Table 4 show that the gains to present and future generations
are largely balanced. Given the anticipated problems with ﬁscal sustainability, it was imperative
to reform the Austrian pension system in a way that would not make it more generous. We
translated this requirement into our policy scenarios such that pensions per capita remained
constant for given behavior, and could increase only as a result of induced behavioral changes.
Table 4 shows that the lengthening of the calculation period mainly shifts labor market incentives
from old to young workers without a systematic net eﬀect. The net welfare eﬀect is rather
33negligible and even slightly negative, reﬂecting the small but negative impact on employment.
Strengthening the tax beneﬁt link, in contrast, promises moderate welfare gains. The ﬁrst two
elements of reform, extension of the calculation period and system harmonization, yield welfare
gains that are reasonably balanced across present and future generations. The cumulative welfare
gain of the present population is equivalent to a permanent income stream of 0.18% of GDP
while the corresponding gain to future generations is somewhat smaller and amounts to 0.12%.
Moving from wage to price indexation without compensating measures is a strategy to restore
sustainability by shifting the burden on retirees whose pensions will increasingly fall behind
wage earnings. While the replacement rate at retirement date should not be too diﬀerent, it
increasingly declines over the remaining life-time. Adding this measure therefore shifts the
welfare gains in Table 4 away from present generations to future ones.9 Finally, introducing
more actuarial fairness reverses this intergenerational redistribution so that the total reform
again beneﬁts current generations relatively more than new generations arriving after the policy
shock. The aggregate welfare gain of the total reform amounts to 1.3% of GDP.
Figure 3 gives a more detailed account of intergenerational redistribution. The bars represent
the equivalent variation of a given population group in percent of life-time wealth and per capita.
The bars to the left of the vertical line show the gains per capita of the eight age groups that
coexist at the date of the policy shock.10 The bars to the right list the gains per capita of future
generations that are born at the dates indicated on the axis. Due to slow capital accumulation
along with continuing wage increases, the welfare gains of future generations still grow beyond
the per capita gains of the youngest age group living at the date of the policy shock. Since
intertemporal prices don’t change in an open economy, the welfare gains of presently living
9This result most likely overstates the welfare losses to current generations since we have not yet found a way
to model grandfathering schemes that would protect the (net of tax) pension incomes of current retirees. Actual
pension reform includes prolonged transitional periods to phase in the changes and allow current generations to
continue under the old rules. While limiting the losses to old generations, such phasing in would much delay the
eﬃciency gains of reform.
10Taking these gains in absolute terms, rather than in percent of life-time wealth, multiplying by the size of
each group, adding up, converting into an annuity stream, and expressing this stream in percent of GDP gives an
aggregate welfare gain of 0.79% of GDP as listed in Table 4. Multiplying the equivalent variations corresponding
to the bars on the right with the size of new cohorts arriving at dates after the policy shock, discounting them
back to the present, adding up and converting into a permanent income stream yields a gain of 0.47% of GDP.
34generations are felt in a change in wealth over the remaining life-time that comes from two
sources. First, the induced investment boom leads to an immediate rise in share prices and to
windfall gains in the value of the capital stock. All existing age groups share in these windfall
gains in proportion to their share in overall ﬁnancial assets. Since age asset proﬁles are hump-
shaped, windfall gains are most important for age groups 3 to 4 , corresponding to people in
their forties and ﬁfties, and least important for the youngest and oldest parts of the population.
The second source is the change in human wealth, consisting of discounted incomes from net
labor earnings, pensions as well as other public transfers, corrected for the utility costs of
generating these earnings. The earlier analysis found that the positive eﬀects of pension reform
in terms of hours worked and unemployment, are mostly with younger workers while workers
near retirement face actually a substantial decline in net earnings due to shorter working time
and somewhat higher unemployment. For this reason, the gains of the mixed age group are
already smaller than those of prime age workers. Also, the mixed group corresponding to people
in their sixties beneﬁts from higher pensions only to the extent that they spend their time in
retirement. Consequently, the rise in per capita pensions weigh much less than for full time
retirees in the following age group.
The rapid decline in welfare gains of still older age groups is due to the declining importance
of windfall gains on ﬁnancial asset holdings and to the lagging pension growth due to the move
to price indexation. The last group has basically no assets left, and is hit the worst from price
indexation.11 Since this group corresponding to people in their nineties make up only 0.2% of the
entire population (see Table 2), this welfare loss per capita can hardly be of any importance for
aggregate results. Our analysis thus promises signiﬁcant aggregate welfare gains, equal to almost
1.3% of GDP as our central estimate, and implies almost a Pareto-improvement. It should not be
impossible to make the reform a true gain for virtually all population groups by a slow phasing
in of the move to price indexation in order to protect the currently old generations. Note ﬁnally
that the aggregate welfare gain is markedly smaller than the long-run increase of consumption
or GDP as reported in Table 4. Not only does it take account of the additional eﬀort costs and
foregone leisure to generate larger wage earnings and consumption, it also appropriately reﬂects
the slow transition with smaller short-run gains.
11As mentioned before, the loss to the oldest age group may be due to our inability in accounting for grandfa-
thering rules.
355C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has analyzed recent pension reform in Austria, using a rich computational model of
life-cycle labor supply, unemployment and retirement. The model also includes in much detail
the institutional features of the Austrian PAYG pension system that importantly determine the
separate, eﬀective (implicit) tax rates on three labor market margins. We can thus represent
the actual parametric reform of the system in much detail. We record the following important
results of our analysis. First, the reform promises a signiﬁcant GDP gain, maybe around 2.7%
in the long-run. GDP growth is mainly driven by expansion of labor inputs on the extensive
and intensive margins that are complemented over time by parallel increases in capital inputs.
Second, the total reform is likely to boost eﬀective labor inputs on all three margins of labor
market behavior. Calibrating the model with econometric estimates of the retirement elasticity,
we ﬁnd that retirement might by postponed on average by almost a year. The associated increase
in aggregate labor supply is further magniﬁed by more hours worked and declining unemployment
of prime age workers. Third, the increase in hours worked and in aggregate employment rates
is mainly concentrated among young prime age workers while people near retirement are hardly
gaining or even loosing. While remaining active for more years, the reduction in hours worked
could be interpreted as an increased demand for part-time employment of older workers. Fourth,
postponed retirement boosts labor market participation of older workers and thus squeezes the
dependency ratio on both sides by simultaneously raising the workforce and reducing the number
of retirees. Pension spending and the PAYG deﬁcit thus decline by almost 1% of GDP in the
long-run. These savings could allow for a signiﬁcant reduction in the wage tax burden in Austria
which is perceived to be overly high by international comparison.
Fifth, the total reform promises signiﬁcant aggregate welfare gains equivalent to about 1.3%
of GDP annually. This calculation takes account of the slow transition and the opportunity costs
of leisure in generating higher wage earnings. The main sources come from the introduction of
larger pension supplements and discounts for increased actuarial fairness, and the harmoniza-
tion of the system. Harmonization subjects a larger share of the population to the earnings
linked pension rules and reduces the share that receives ﬂat pensions unrelated to past earnings.
Sixth, the greatest sensitivity of our results lies in the assumed elasticity of retirement behavior.
Diﬀerent behavioral assumptions regarding the elasticities of job search and hours worked are
36aﬀecting not so much the aggregate results but might exacerbate the diﬀerential impact on young
and old workers. Finally, we point out that the aggregate welfare results might be overstated to
some extent by our inability so far to take account of grandfathering rules that are designed to
slowly phase in the reforms. Slow phasing in implies that new rules would apply only to future
generations while a large part of present generations could continue under the old rules. We
conjecture that slow phasing in would delay the eﬃciency gains of the reform and slow down
the transition, leading to smaller short-run gains that will be felt in a lower total welfare gain
aggregated over all generations. However, these grandfathering rules will also protect the old
generations from the welfare losses that we have recorded in our simulations, and might possibly
make the reform a Pareto improvement, although with smaller gains to transitional generations.
Appendix: The Simulation Model
This appendix highlights those parts of the model which facilitate a more precise interpretation
of the simulation results. Jaag et al. (2007) provide a complete documentation. The model
is based on the ‘probabilistic aging’ concept introduced by Grafenhofer et al. (2006). It is
a generalization of Gertler (1999) who ﬁrst introduced a simple life-cycle structure into the
‘perpetual youth’ OLG model of Blanchard (1995) by allowing for a stochastic transition from
work to retirement. Our model distinguishes not two, but eight diﬀerent groups of workers and
retirees and therefore yields a much closer approximation of the life-cycle. The mortality and
life-cycle transition rates for each group together determine the demographic structure. Agents
are symmetric within each group and heterogeneous across groups. In particular, they diﬀer in
the length of time they spend in a given age state. Each age group is analytically aggregated so
that the aggregate economy can be parsimoniously represented with a relatively small number
of state variables. In calibrating the model, an age group is assigned the average characteristics
of a group of cohorts as shown in Table 2. The period length of the model is a calender year,
allowing for realistic short and long-run dynamics.
We consider here only the decision of the ‘mixed group’ of people in their 60s which consists
of workers and retirees. We approximate endogenous retirement by assuming that agents in
the mixed group are, in any period, working a fraction x of their time endowment and spend a
37fraction 1−x in retirement. Retiring later raises the share of work income and correspondingly
reduces the share of pensions in total income. Younger groups exclusively receive wage income
(x =1 ) while older groups are fully retired (x =0 ) and earn pensions only. Total pension
income P + p0 is taxed at rate tp and consists of an earnings linked part P and a ﬂat basic
pension p0. Workers are endowed with θ eﬃciency units of labor, earning a wage w per unit
or wn net of wage taxes and social security contributions. Working l hours, agents earn lwnθ
when employed with probability 1−u (= e in section 2). When unemployed with probability u




θ which are partly indexed
to net wages (giving a fraction bU of the ‘last’ net wage income) and partly constant in real
terms. We assume that a fraction 1 − ε of workers ﬁnds a job instantaneously, while ε of them
must search in a matching market. They locate a job with probability sf where s is search
eﬀort and f reﬂects market tightness. The life-cycle speciﬁc unemployment rate consists of the
unsuccessful job searchers as a share of the active work force in a given age group. Members of
the mixed group thus obtain an average income12
¯ y = x · y +( 1− x) · (1 − tp)(P + p0),





wn =( 1− tw − ts)w, u =( 1− sf)ε.
(A.1)
Given that active wage income is larger than net pension income, y>(1 − tp)(P + p0), agents
can increase their average income by working a larger part x in their mixed age period and
spending a smaller part in retirement. This income gain from postponing retirement is oﬀset by
a progressively increasing disutility cost ϕR (x).
Agents save and accumulate assets A to smooth consumption C and accumulate pension
entitlements P under the rules of an earnings linked pension system:
γGAt+1 = Rt+1 [A +¯ y + z − C], (A.2)
GPt+1 = µw (x) · m ·
¡
1 − u + b1u
¢
wlθ + µp (x) · P.
Agents earn average work related income ¯ y and receive government transfers z.F u r t h e r ,G>1
is a growth factor reﬂecting labor productivity growth, R is one plus the interest rate, and γ
12The average income at date t of a person belonging to age group a with life-cycle history α would be ¯ y
a
α,t.T o
concentrate on essential insights, we suppress indices and write ¯ y. See Jaag et al. (2007) for a precise notation.
38is the survival rate, equal to one minus the mortality rate, and reﬂects the existence of reverse
life-insurance as in Blanchard (1985). Pension entitlements Pt+1 next period are equal to today’s
stock plus some additions. They grow with new entitlements in the amount of µw·m times current
wage income. In Austria, a part b1 of the base for unemployment beneﬁts is also included in the
pension assessment base.
Retirement incentives are controlled by the functions µw and µp. Positive derivatives serve to
compensate the agent with pension supplements for longer contribution payments (µ0
wm times
wage base) and foregone pension beneﬁts (µ0




and µp (x)=µ1 ¡
x − xR¢
+ µ1
p capture a range of possible cases. Retiring at the “statutory
retirement age”, x = xR, yields a regular pension. The slope µ1 rewards late retirement with
extra beneﬁts and punishes early retirement with pension discounts. Prime age workers (x =1 )
accumulate pension claims as in (A.2) except that µw = µp =1 .
In any period, agents make a sequence of decisions. They (i) choose labor market participa-
tion (‘retirement date’ x), (ii) search for employment with intensity s if a job is not immediately
available, (iii) choose hours of work l, (iv) bargain over a wage w when a job is found, and
(v) choose consumption and savings. Preferences are given by recursive CES utility. The in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution is σ =1 /(1 − ρ) and β is a subjective discount factor. The
agent’s optimization problem is13
V a
t =m a x
£






¯ V a ≡ ωa V a +( 1− ωa)V a+1, (A.3)
¯ ϕ = εϕS (s)+( 1− u)ϕL (l).
In any period t, agents stay in the current age state with probability ωa but switch to the next
state of age with probability 1 − ωa, giving rise to an expected utility ¯ V a
t+1. The assumption of
separable eﬀort costs, ϕR (x) of postponing retirement, ϕS (s) of job search, and ϕL (l) of hours
worked, excludes income eﬀects on work related eﬀort and greatly facilitates the analysis.
At each date, agents consume a fraction of life-time resources. Much like in standard life-
cycle models, the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth increases when agents move
to the next age state and the end of life becomes more probable. To illustrate labor market
13To avoid cluttered notation, we index age groups only when absolutely necessary.
39b e h a v i o r ,i ti su s e f u lt od e ﬁne an implicit pension tax ˆ ts and subsidy su to unemployment,













where ˜ λ is the present value of future beneﬁts per unit of accumulated entitlement P.F o rp r i m e
age workers, µw/x =1 . This term enters only in the semi-retired group to capture retirement
incentives which might reward prolonged contribution payments with higher pension beneﬁts.
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(1 − u)wlθ − ¯ ϕθ, (A.5)




























The rules of social insurance importantly aﬀect the incentives to engage in labor market
activities. Hours worked are chosen by equating marginal utility cost with the eﬀective net
wage. On top of the marginal wage tax tw,t h eeﬀective tax rate τL is increased by the implicit
pension tax ˆ ts deﬁned in (A.4). Working more hours today expands the current assessment base
and thereby augments future pension beneﬁts, depending on the tax beneﬁtl i n kmµw/x (or m
for prime age workers). The present value of future beneﬁts is captured by the shadow price
˜ λt+1. This additional return strengthens work eﬀort by reducing the tax component ˆ ts implicit
in the statutory contribution rate ts.T h ee ﬀective tax on hours worked is reduced to the extent
that unemployment beneﬁts are indexed to net earnings. Given beneﬁt indexation at rate bU,
a higher net salary also raises the beneﬁt should the agent become unemployed, showing up in
a higher unemployment subsidy su. Depending on the factor b1 in (A.2), higher earnings also
add to the pension assessment base during periods of unemployment, resulting in higher pension
beneﬁts in the future. This extra gain shows up in a higher unemployment subsidy and a lower
eﬀective tax rate on intensive labor supply.
Search eﬀort raises the probability sf of successfully locating a job by f at the margin which
increases the expected income gain from obtaining a job. The condition for job search thus
40compares this marginal expected beneﬁt with the marginal utility cost of search. The eﬀective
tax rate τS collects all ﬁscal barriers against job search that are related to gross earnings wl.
On top of the wage tax, the eﬀective tax rate consists of the implicit pension tax, and is thus
reduced by the value of future pension beneﬁts that are tied to current earnings. Unemployment
beneﬁts, both lump-sum and earnings related, reduce incentives for job search. The earnings
related part shows up in a higher eﬀective rate τS via the unemployment subsidy. The eﬀective
tax is also inﬂated by the fact that periods of unemployment are included in the assessment base
and create additional future pension beneﬁts. The unemployment subsidy and the eﬀective tax
rate are higher for this reason as well.
The optimal retirement date is found when the marginal utility cost of prolonged partici-
pation balances the present value of net income gains. In the absence of the public sector, the
instantaneous gain from another year of work would be (1 − u)wlθ− ¯ ϕθ. The participation tax
rate τR summarizes all ﬁscal beneﬁts and costs of postponing retirement and expresses them as
a share of gross earnings (1 − u)wlθ. It consists of the sum of the statutory tax rates tw+ts,a n d
is reduced by the replacement rate of unemployment beneﬁts if the worker remains unemployed
(third term in A.5). In fact, unemployment is an often chosen pathway to retirement. In the
model, unemployment compensation helps to contain early retirement, although at a cost to
the unemployment insurance scheme. Further, the participation tax is importantly increased by
the pension replacement rate which reﬂects the opportunity cost of continued work in terms of
forgone net pensions.
The last two terms in the numerator reﬂect the degree of actuarial fairness in the pension
formula. The opportunity cost of continued work is reduced (increased) by the marginal change
in future beneﬁts due to pension supplements (discounts) when the agent marginally retires later
(earlier). The present value of these future gains (or losses) are captured by the shadow price ˜ λ.
In the absence of government, the participation tax is zero, τR =0 . When there are no earnings
related pensions (i.e. no tax-beneﬁtl i n k ,m = ¯ P =0 ), no other taxes (tp = tw =0 ), and no
unemployment insurance (b =0 ), the eﬀective tax is τR = ts + p0/(wlθ) as in a Beveridge type
system. Being the sum of the statutory contribution and pension replacement rates, it tends to
be high. Strengthening actuarial fairness by compensating for prolonged contribution payments,
µ0
w > 0, and foregone beneﬁts, µ0
p > 0, greatly reduces the participation tax.
41References
[1] Altig, D. and C.T. Carlstrom (1999), Marginal Tax Rates and Income Inequality in a Life-
Cycle Model, American Economic Review 89, 1197-1215.
[2] Altig, D., A.J. Auerbach, L.J. Kotlikoﬀ, K.A. Smetters and J. Walliser (2001), Simulating
Fundamental Tax Reform in the United States, American Economic Review 91, 574-595.
[3] Blanchard, O. J. (1985), Debt, Deﬁcits and Finite Horizons, Journal of Political Economy
93, 223-247.
[4] Blanchard, O.J. and J. Wolfers (2000), The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of
European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence, Economic Journal 110, S1-S33.
[5] Blundell, R.W. and T. MaCurdy (1999), Labor Supply: A Review of Alternative Ap-
proaches, in: O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (Hrsg.), Handbook of Labor Economics,V o l .3 A ,
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[6] Blundell, R., M. C. Dias and C. Meghir (2003), The Impact of Wage Subsidies: A General
Equilibrium,m i m e o .
[7] Boone, J. and L. Bovenberg (2002), Optimal Labour Taxation and Search, Journal of Public
Economics 85, 53-97.
[8] Bovenberg, L. A. (2003), Financing Retirement in the European Union, International Tax
and Public Finance 10, 713—734.
[9] Börsch-Supan, A. (2000), Incentive Eﬀects of Social Security on Labor Force Participation:
Evidence in Germany and Across Europe, Journal of Public Economics 78, 25-49.
[10] Börsch-Supan, A. and R. Schnabel (2000), Social Security and Declining Labor Force Par-
ticipation in Germany, American Economic Review 88, 173-178.
[11] Cahuc, P. and A. Zylberberg (2004), Labor Economics,M I TP r e s s .
[12] Costa, D. (1995), Pensions and Retirement: Evidence from Union Army Veterans, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 110, 297-319.
[13] Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (2003), The Double Dividend of Postponing Retirement, Inter-
national Tax and Public Finance 10, 419-434.
[14] Daveri, F. and G. Tabellini (2000), Unemployment, Growth and Taxation in Industrial
Countries, Economic Policy 30, 49-104.
[15] Diamond, P. (2004), Social Security, American Economic Review 94, 1-24.
[16] Diamond, P. and P. R. Orszag (2005), Saving Social Security, Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 19, 11-32.
[17] Disney, R. (2004), Are Contributions to Public Social Security Programmes a Tax on Em-
ployment, Economic Policy 39, 267-311.
42[18] Duval R. (2003), The Retirement Eﬀects of Old-age Pension and Early Retirement Schemes
in OECD Countries, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No.370.
[19] European Commission (2007a), Adequate and Sustainable Pensions. Synthesis Report 2006,
Directorate General for Employment, Social Aﬀairs, and Equal Opportunities, Unit E.4
[20] European Commission (2007b), Indicators for monitoring the Employment Guidelines. 2007
Compendium, Directorate General for Employment, Social Aﬀairs, and Equal Opportuni-
ties.
[21] European Commission (2006a), The Impact of Ageing on Public Expenditure: Projections
for the EU25 Member States on Pensions, Healthcare, Long-term Care, Education and
Unemployment Transfers (2004-50), European Economy, Special Report No. 1/2006.
[22] European Commission (2006b), Report on the Austrian Pension Strategy 2005, Republic of
Austria.
[23] European Commission (2004), Increasing the Employment of Older Workers and Delaying
the Exit from the Labour Market, COM(2004) 146 ﬁnal.
[24] European Commission (2003a), The Stockholm and Barcelona Targets: Increasing Employ-
ment of Older Workers and Delaying the Exit from the Labour Market,C o m m i s s i o nS t a ﬀ
Working Paper SEC(2003) 429.
[25] European Commission (2003b), Report on the Austrian Pension Strategy 2002, Republic of
Austria.
[26] European Commission (2001), Budgetary challenges posed by ageing populations: the impact
on public spending on pensions, health amd long-term care for the elderly and possible in-
dicators of the long-term sustainablity of public ﬁnances, Directorate General for Economic
and Financial Aﬀairs of the European Commission, EPC/ECFIN/655/01-EN ﬁnal
[27] Felderer, B., R. Koman and U. Schuh (2006), Investigating the Introduction of NDCs in
Austria, in R. Holzmann and E. Palmer (eds.), Pension Reform. Issues and Prospects for
Non-Financial Deﬁned Contribution Schemes, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 519-549.
[28] Feldstein, M. (2005), Rethinking Social Insurance, American Economic Review 95, 1-24.
[29] Feldstein, M. and D. Altman (2007), Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts, in: J.M.
Poterba (ed.), Tax Policy and the Economy 21, MIT Press, 35-63.
[30] Feldstein, M. and J. B. Liebman (2002), Social Security, in A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein
(eds.), Handbook of Public Economics Vol. 4, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2245-2324.
[31] Feldstein, M. and A. Samwick (1992), Social Security Rules and Marginal Tax Rates, Na-
tional Tax Journal 45, 1-22.
[32] Fenge, R. and P. Pestieau (2005), Social Security and Early Retirement, Cambridge: MIT
Press.
[33] Fenge, R. and M. Werding (2004), Ageing and the Tax Implied in Public Pension Schemes:
Simulations for Selected OECD Countries, Fiscal Studies 25, 159—200.
43[34] Fisher, W.H. and C. Keuschnigg (2007), Pension Reform and Labor Market Incentives,
CESifo WP 2057.
[35] Gertler, Mark (1999), Government Debt and Social Security in a Life-Cycle Economy,
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 50, 61-110.
[36] Grafenhofer, D., C. Jaag, C. Keuschnigg, and M. Keuschnigg (2006), Probabilistic Aging,
CESifo WP No. 1680.
[37] Gruber, J. and D. A. Wise, eds. (1999), Social Security and Retirement around the World,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[38] Gruber, J. and D. A. Wise (eds, 2004), Social Security and Retirement around the World:
Micro-Estimation, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[39] Gruber, J. und D. A. Wise (2005), Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the
World: Fiscal Implications, NBER Working Paper 11290.
[40] Heijdra, Ben J. and Ward E. Romp (2008), A Life-Cycle Overlapping Generations Model
of a Small Open Economy, Oxford Economic Papers 60, 89-122.
[41] Heijdra, Ben J. and Ward E. Romp (2007), Retirement, Pensions, and Ageing,C E S i f oW P
1974.
[42] Hofer, H. and R. Koman (2006), Social Security and Retirement in Austria, Empirica 33,
285-313.
[43] Holmlund, B. (1998), Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice, Scandinavian Jour-
nal of Economics 100, 113-141.
[44] Hosios, A.J. (1990), On the Eﬃciency of Matching and Related Models of Search and
Unemployment, Review of Economic Studies 57, 279-298.
[45] Immervoll, H., H. J. Kleven, C. T. Kreiner and E. Saez (2007), Welfare Reform in European
Countries: A Microsimulation Analysis, Economic Journal 117, 1—44.
[46] Jaag, C., C. Keuschnigg and M. Keuschnigg (2007), Pension Reform, Retirement and Life-
Cycle Unemployment: Technical Appendix, University of St. Gallen, www.iﬀ.unisg.ch, page
Research/DP Public Finance.
[47] Kleven, H. J. and C. T. Kreiner (2006), The Marginal Cost of Public Funds: Hours of Work
Versus Labor Force Participation, Journal of Public Economics 90, 1955—1973.
[48] Knell, M., W. Koehler-Toeglhofer and D. Prammer (2006), The Austrian Pension System
- How Recent Reforms Have Changed Fiscal Sustainability and Pension Beneﬁts,A u s t r i a n
National Bank, DP.
[49] Krueger, A. B. and B. D. Meyer (2002), Labor Supply Eﬀects of Social Insurance, in A.
J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics Vol. 3,A m s t e r d a m :
Elsevier, 2327-2392.
44[50] Layard, R., S. Nickel and R. Jackman (1991), Unemployment, London: Oxford University
Press.
[51] Lindbeck, A. and M. Persson (2003), The Gains from Pension Reform, Journal of Economic
Literature 41, 74-112.
[52] Nickel, S. (1997), Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North Amer-
ica, Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 55-74.
[53] OECD (2005), Aging and Employment Policies. Austria,P a r i s :O E C D .
[54] Pestieau, P. (2006), The Welfare State in the European Union. Economic and Social Per-
spectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[55] Saez, E. (2002), Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor
Supply Responses, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1039-1073.
[56] Samwick, A. A. (1998), New Evidence on Pensions, social security, and the timing of re-
tirement, Journal of Public Economics 70, 207-236.
[57] Scarpetta, S. (1996), Assessing the Role of Labour Market Policies and Institutional Settings
on Unemployment: A Cross-Country Study, OECD Economic Studies 26, 43-98.
[58] Spataro, L. (2005), Social Security Incentives and Retirement Decisions in Italy: An Em-
pirical Insight, Research in Economics 59, 223-256.
[59] Weil, D. N. (2006), Population Aging, NBER WP 12147.
45